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Abstract Climate variability is amongst an array of threats
facing agricultural livelihoods, with its effects unevenly
distributed. With resource conflict being increasingly
recognised as one significant outcome of climate variability
and change, understanding the underlying drivers that shape
differential vulnerabilities in areas that are double-exposed
to climate and conflict has great significance. Climate
change vulnerability frameworks are rarely applied in water
conflict research. This article presents a composite climate–
water conflict vulnerability index based on a double expo-
sure framework developed from advances in vulnerability
and livelihood assessments. We apply the index to assess
how the determinants of vulnerability can be useful in
understanding climate variability and water conflict inter-
actions and to establish how knowledge of the climate–
conflict linked context can shape interventions to reduce
vulnerability. We surveyed 240 resource users (farmers,
fishermen and pastoralists) in seven villages on the south-
eastern shores of Lake Chad in the Republic of Chad to
collect data on a range of exposure, sensitivity and adaptive
capacity variables. Results suggest that pastoralists are
more vulnerable in terms of climate-structured aggressive
behaviour within a lake-based livelihoods context where all
resource user groups show similar levels of exposure to
climate variability. Our approach can be used to understand
the human and environmental security components of vul-
nerability to climate change and to explore ways in which
conflict-structured climate adaptation and climate-sensitive
conflict management strategies can be integrated to reduce
the vulnerability of populations in high-risk, conflict-prone
environments.
Keywords Double exposure  Climate variability  Water
conflict  Vulnerability assessment  Human security
Introduction
The growing effects of climate variability and change have
triggered an array of vulnerability assessment models
seeking to identify ways to protect vulnerable people and
livelihoods in locations exposed to perturbations and
stresses (e.g. Antwi-Agyei et al. 2012; Reed et al. 2013;
Wire´hn et al. 2015). Livelihood research recognises the
need to understand how human and environmental condi-
tions influence the means to make a living (Scoones 2009).
This understanding often finds relevance in place-based
livelihood vulnerability analysis, where methods to oper-
ationalise vulnerability focus on the specificity of localised
concerns or variables (Turner et al. 2003). The concept of
double exposure was popularised by O’Brien and Lei-
chenko (2000) in their accounts of climate change and
economic globalisation interactions. The concept invokes
the notion of multiple and overlapping processes of change
(biophysical and socio-economic) that take place within
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particular localities. It emphasises how contextual condi-
tions influence the exposure and capacities of populations
to create new contexts for experiencing and responding to
change (Silva et al. 2010). This perspective has been
applied to understand vulnerability through the lens of
conflict-generating social dynamics across national and
sub-national scales (Mason et al. 2011; Busby et al. 2013;
Ide et al. 2014).
The climate security research community now recog-
nises that exposure to climate and conflict stresses presents
a critical challenge for locations where natural resources
are declining and livelihood losses are driving people into
conflict-structured practices (Gemenne et al. 2014; Schef-
fran et al. 2014). Discourses in this domain are useful for
stressing human security and climate vulnerability con-
cerns (Detraz 2011). Nonetheless, research into what
makes a place vulnerable to the conflict consequences of
climate change has tended to create more confusion than
answers (Buhaug 2015). This may be related to a limited
strategic understanding of ‘the nature of the state’ as
against ‘the state of nature’ (see Raleigh et al. 2014),
leaving a major gap in the literature where ‘views from the
vulnerable’ (Tschakert 2007) provide useful insight.
Except for Busby et al.’s (2014) work on climate security
vulnerability which maps ‘double-exposed’ locations in
Africa using sub-national level data, vulnerability frame-
works are rarely applied in climate conflict studies at
household and community levels—which is the scale at
which processes generating vulnerability can be narrowly
defined and validated (Barnett et al. 2008). A bottom-up,
systematic approach to operationalise climate–water con-
flict vulnerability holds promise in terms of teasing out the
repertoire of interacting variables that influence climate
and conflict relationships.
In this paper, we develop and apply a composite cli-
mate–water conflict vulnerability index (CWCVI) to: (1)
identify and compare the vulnerabilities of farming, fishing
and pastoral livelihoods in the Lake Chad basin to climate
variability and water conflict; (2) assess whether and how
the determinants of vulnerability can be useful in under-
standing climate and water conflict interactions; and (3)
explore how a climate–conflict linked context in which
vulnerability is experienced can inform interventions to
reduce vulnerability in conflict-prone environments. Fur-
ther, we introduce a double exposure index (DEI) as an
embedded component of the CWCVI to capture differential
‘climate–water conflict’ exposures amongst different
livelihood groups. The paper serves the ‘ground-truthing’
requirements for studies on climate change and conflict
hotspot mapping (e.g. Busby et al. 2014; de Sherbinin
2014) where field-based data validation is essential. Our
systematic, multi-method approach provides a method-
ological contribution in line with the demand to combine a
diversity of approaches and methods to investigate the full
complexity of climate conflict links in human–environment
systems (Gemenne et al. 2014). Our focus on a village-
level assessment in Lake Chad contributes to a growing
strand of vulnerability literature which seeks to enhance the
rigour and utility of indicator-based vulnerability
assessments.
Theoretical background
Indicator-based vulnerability assessment
Vulnerability is perceived as a state of defencelessness or
powerlessness for people threatened directly or indirectly
by changing conditions caused by a single or a collection of
stressors (O’Brien et al. 2009). In climate change impact
studies, vulnerability often draws attention to notions of
exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity (IPCC 2007),
including fragility and human security (Barnett and Adger
2007). Vulnerability assessments focus on identifying
determinants of vulnerability by investigating reasons
behind unequal exposure, impacts or responses. The pri-
ority areas are usually to identify vulnerable places, people
and sectors, to raise awareness on where adaptation funds
should be directed and to monitor adaptation policies
(Luers et al. 2003). These are recognised as necessary for
enhancing the utility of vulnerability reduction strategies in
development planning (Oppio et al. 2015).
Vulnerabilities of individuals and communities are ini-
tiated by different interacting biophysical and socio-eco-
nomic stressors. The extent to which populations are able
to protect themselves is contingent upon how they are able
to adjust (Reid and Vogel 2006; Tschakert 2007). Yet, as
O’Brien et al. (2004, 2009) point out, assessments are often
undertaken in isolation from ongoing global negative
interacting outcomes. This is often the case for social
stressors driven by human conflict (Mason et al. 2011).
However, vulnerability indicators are now widely applied
to account for interacting shocks and stressors and in par-
ticular to enhance the communicative power of vulnera-
bility assessment findings (Tonmoy et al. 2014). Indeed,
growing interest in understanding the forces that shape the
state of affairs in vulnerable countries has made the use of
vulnerability indicators relevant in vulnerability hotspot
mapping (Hinkel 2011; Abson et al. 2012).
Several criticisms have been raised regarding the scien-
tific novelty and policy relevance of vulnerability indicators.
Many suggest that indicators are ‘a typical example of failed
science-policy communication’ (Hinkel 2011: p. 199) par-
ticularly in relation to the non-transparent manner in which
methodologies for developing indicators are presented
(Eriksen and Kelly 2006; Barnett et al. 2008). Scientific
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definitions and frameworks guiding vulnerability assess-
ments are generally imprecise about methodologies. For
example, Working Group II of the International Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC 2007) identifies exposure, sensitivity
and adaptive capacity as the defining components of vul-
nerability. Yet the largely subjective connotation of these
components makes it unclear how they can combine to
capture vulnerability, as well as the relationships between
them (Wolf et al. 2013). Many vulnerability indicators cap-
ture these components separately, paying limited or no
attention to how to integrate them. The lack of communality
in definitions has oftenmeant that indicatorsmust come from
the specific research or policy questions considered (Wolf
et al. 2013). Further, due to the place-based and context-
specific nature of vulnerability, normative value judgement
has tended to guide many vulnerability assessment
methodologies (Hahn et al. 2009; Shah et al. 2013).
Despite criticisms concerning the use of indicators, their
local relevance is widely supported (Barnett et al. 2008;
Orencio and Fujii 2013). In this paper, we conceptualise
vulnerability as a theoretical, non-observable phenomenon
that relates to the propensity of a system, subsystem or
system component to experience harm due to exposure to a
perturbation or stressor (Turner et al. 2003). We apply
observable variables or indicators to operationalise vul-
nerability, focusing on agricultural livelihoods in a lake-
dependent environment.
Framing climate conflict vulnerability in water-
limited environments
Climate and conflict are rarely examined together in vul-
nerability science or within a single vulnerability frame-
work (Eriksen and Lind 2005). Similarly, little work has
advanced vulnerability models to capture climate and
conflict stressors at household and community levels in
locations facing severe water scarcity. The absence of a
common narrative that explains vulnerability evidently
influences how vulnerability to the water conflict conse-
quences of climate change is understood and interpreted.
Existing theoretical state-of-the-art literature seeking
explanations for climate conflict highlights many method-
ological postulations which have produced more divisions
than agreements (Buhaug 2015). The diversity of ways in
which conflict is conceived is accompanied by a similar
diversity of proxies used to quantify climate change across
systems and within temporal and spatial scales. Conver-
sations in this field typically draw upon the environmental
security thesis (Homer-Dixon 1999; Le Billon 2001) as the
basis for a theoretical understanding of the role of envi-
ronmental resources in conflict events. Water has remained
a key element in the literature given its characteristic fea-
ture as a resource worth fighting for (Cook and Bakker
2012), e.g. when power relations and ineffective water
governance affect water sharing, particularly where rivers
flow across state boundaries (Ludwig et al. 2011).
Although there is a rich literature on whether climate
change impacts on water supplies is a factor in domestic
conflicts, little is known about where the livelihood vul-
nerability literature fits in the environmental security dis-
course. The concept of vulnerability is less evident in water
conflict studies compared with poverty, food security and
disaster risk management studies. Mainstream writings
(e.g. Bo¨hmelt et al. 2014; Selby and Hoffmann 2014)
explore indicators that suggest a pathway linking climate
change and water conflict. Yet the literature remains vague
regarding how vulnerability analysis may enable identifi-
cation of interacting variables that shape both the demand
for and supply of water, including efforts to restrain water
conflict in lakeside villages where climate extremes are a
major threat. To anticipate appropriate solutions for
resource-dependent societies marred by conflict requires
knowledge from the broad fields of climate security,
livelihoods and vulnerability science to investigate the
structures and processes that shape the propensity for
livelihoods to be weakened by exposure to climate stres-
sors and violence (Mason et al. 2011). Important aspects
include, for example, knowing how people’s adaptability is
shaped by socio-demographic profiles, livelihood strategies
and social/political networks. Giving climate vulnerability
a security focus (Scheffran et al. 2012) and knowing the
vulnerability condition in which households and groups are
‘powerless’ or ‘wounded’ has huge practical significance
(Fu¨ssel and Klein 2006).
Study area and methodology
Study area
Lake Chad’s water resources support agricultural liveli-
hoods spanning rural villages in four countries (Cameroon,
Chad, Niger and Nigeria) (Odada et al. 2006). Although the
Lake lost more than 90 % of its waters between 1963 and
2012 (Lemoalle et al. 2012), the Chadian shore continued
to hold a relatively large portion of the Lake’s remaining
open waters, creating spaces for frequent trading and
interactions amongst migrants of diverse ethnic groups.
Our study focuses on the south-eastern shore and islands of
the Lake Chad basin (12o53
00
N; 14o37
00
E), in the Haraze Al
Biar administrative unit of the Republic of Chad. This
location has a population of 1,50, 070 (Geohive 2015),
characterised by villages that are geographically and
politically remote.
Lake Chad is recognised as a location where human
security is and will be progressively threatened as climate
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changes (Kafumbata et al. 2014). Thus, the precarious
security situation, as evident in the manner the Lake
environment acts as a cover for criminal and terrorist
activities (Ifabiyi 2013), limited our choice of study loca-
tion to seven villages1 in close proximity to the Lake.
These were jointly selected for data collection in 2014 by
the Lake Chad Basin Commission and a local NGO, the
Chadian Indigenous Peule Mbororo Association. They are
considered representative of farming, fishing and pastoral
villages made up of livelihood groups that are generally
and historically exposed to disruptive climate extremes and
conflicts in the region (Table 1). Average annual rainfall is
approximately 200–500 mm with maximum rainfall
observed during July–September, while average tempera-
ture is approximately 27 C, ranging from 21 to 36 C
throughout the year (Amaral et al. 2013). Since the 1970 s,
intense droughts have impacted water supplies and, in turn,
have intensified aggression and conflicts around the Lake
for which several hundreds of lives have been lost (Onuoha
2009).
The CWCVI framework approach
Climate–water conflict vulnerability was assessed based on
the broader discourse on livelihoods (Ellis 2000), vulner-
ability (Fu¨ssel 2007) and the security consequences of
climate change on human well-being (Adger 2010). We
couch the composite index within the double stressor/ex-
posure framework (Leichenko and Brien 2008) which
emphasises the importance of dissecting the underlying
contexts (using a contextual vulnerability interpretation (cf.
O’Brien et al. 2007)) in which vulnerability is experienced,
including how adaptation outcomes may reduce or amplify
vulnerability (Silva et al. 2010).
We account for the security aspect of the double expo-
sure framework by applying aspects of Busby et al.’s
(2014) framing of climate security vulnerability, where
vulnerability is conceived as a condition where people
could be susceptible to death as a result of exposure to
climate-related hazards. However, this past study lacks a
bottom-up livelihoods approach. Instead, we frame cli-
mate–water conflict vulnerability as the propensity to be
constrained by conflict-structured water threats as a result
of climate stress. This encompasses situations where
human populations are at risk of losing their livelihoods,
including loss of life. Assessment of vulnerability in this
context opens up considerations for a human security
perspective in which attention is given to understanding
biophysical exposures and socio-economic strategies to
assist vulnerable populations from threats that limit their
livelihoods and freedom (Adger 2010; Mason et al. 2011).
Index computation
We adopt a five-step interrelated process to compute the
CWCVI (Fig. 1). Based on Fu¨ssel’s (2007) suggestion for
describing a vulnerable situation, we identify the ‘human–
environment system’ as our system of interest. By con-
ceiving climate variability and water conflict as human
well-being and livelihood security challenges, we identify
the system’s valued attributes as ‘livelihoods and human
well-being’ and the stresses of interest as ‘climate vari-
ability and water conflict’. For the ‘time period of interest’,
we focus on a static snapshot of ‘current’ differential vul-
nerabilities occurring during 2009–2014, as vulnerability at
the household level tends to be more dynamic than at
national level (Eakin and Bojo´rquez-Tapia 2008). Resource
user groups in the study villages constitute the unit of
analysis. We utilise the IPCC’s tripartite typology of
exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity (IPCC 2007) as
a simple entry point for expressing vulnerability. We
incorporate this typology in our categorisation
scheme (Fig. 2) to identify seven indicating baskets that we
consider relevant to operationalising vulnerability: expo-
sure to (1) climate variability and (2) water conflict; sen-
sitivity to (3) lake water variability and (4) physical/natural
assets; and adaptive capacity captured by (5) socio-demo-
graphic profile, (6) livelihood income strategies and (7)
social/political networks.
Indicators were selected deductively based on a review of
the literature considering a broad spectrum of social and
environmental challenges facing Lake Chad (e.g. UNEP
2004; Luxereau et al. 2012; Ovie and Emma 2012). Indica-
tors were validated through consultations with Lake Chad
Basin Commission staff and other professionals with spe-
cialist knowledge on the study themes. We incorporated the
selected indicators into our questionnaires and confirmed the
practicality of collecting the needed data through an initial
field visit in July 2013. The supplementary material outlines
how each indicator was quantified, the rationale for selecting
each, as well as the survey questions used to collect the data
associated with each indicator.
Raw household survey data were transformed into
appropriate measurement units (percentages and indices)
used to quantify the indicators. The CWCVI uses indicators
measured on different scales. To bring the indicators to a
uniform, comparable scale and allow for aggregation into a
single index, standardisation was necessary (OECD 2008).
We use a maximum–minimum (percentage ranked) trans-
formation approach (Hahn et al. 2009) to capture the actual
score of an indicator relative to the maximum and
1 The villages are Miterine and Guitte (farming villages), Kaesai,
Basara and Kouri (fishing villages) and Dandi, Ngurutu and Guitte
(pastoral villages). Guitte is a mixed farming and pastoral village. See
Table A5 in the Supplementary Material.
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minimum spread of the entire range of values for that
indicator. This was computed by obtaining the quotient of
the difference between each actual indicator score and the
minimum value of that indicator and the difference
between the maximum and minimum values obtained from
the total sample.
Weights are an important aspect of indexing approa-
ches (see Barnett et al. 2008; Hinkel 2011; Wolf et al.
2013). Although what constitutes an appropriate weight-
ing system can vary significantly based on contexts (Chen
and Lopez-Carr 2015), we applied the balanced/equal
weights framework used in Hahn et al. (2009) assuming
that each indicating basket contributes equally to a
group’s overall vulnerability despite that the number of
indicators under each basket differs. Although this
approach is adjustable, for example, to reflect the judge-
ment of experts and values of groups in a participatory
method (Eakin and Bojo´rquez-Tapia 2008), or by using
the principal component analysis method (Abson et al.
2012), we regard our scheme as appropriate for conflict-
prone settings where data are relatively difficult to gather
and comparison is focused on groups perceived to be
similarly exposed.
Finally, we calculated the value for the baskets by taking
the average scores of the standardised indicators in each
basket using Eq. 1:
Table 1 A synthesis of climate and conflict events in Lake Chad based on secondary data sources
Exposure Period Source
Climate exposure
Past droughts: four severe drought events recorded since 1970 1972–1975, 1982–1985,
1989–1992, 2002–2005
UNEP (2004, 2006)
Variation in past maximum temperature (oC)
Reference period average: 36
Average of anomalies: 0.004
Standard deviation: 0.64
1960–2008 Computed from
DREM (2013)
Variation in past minimum temperature (oC)
Reference period average: 21
Average of anomalies: 0.07
Standard deviation: 0.81
1960–2008 DREM (2013)
Variation in past rainfall (mm)
Long-term average: 436
Standard deviation: 111.79
1980–2008 DREM (2013)
Conflict exposure
Boko Haram related (selected examples)
Battle along the Chad/Nigeria border of Lake Chad in Kukawa killed hundreds of
locals
19–20/4/2013 ACLED (2015)
Boko Haram killed 7 fishermen, injured 15 others, burnt boats and nets used for
fishing on Lake Chad near Baga
28/11/2013 ACLED (2015)
Gunmen attacked a Lake Chad community (Malamfatori, Abadam LGA) in Chad
killing 10
17/10/2014 ACLED (2015)
Fish traders ambushed, had their throats slit and drowned in Lake Chad (48 killed) 24/11/2014 ACLED (2015)
Three islands in Lake Chad attacked by gunmen, 19 local farmers and fishermen
died of bullet wounds, fire and drowning
1/3/2015 ACLED (2015)
Water-related conflicts (selected examples)
Territorial water disputes killed 5 and displaced many in Lake Chad 15/5–24/7, 1981 ICB (2015)
Fierce battle over the ownership of new islands as a result of falling water levels of
the Lake (84 killed)
18/4–11/7, 1983 ICB (2015)
Clashes between two villages in Bol, Lake Chad over ownership of water points
due to droughts/water scarcity (11 killed)
14–15/5, 1995 SCAD (2015)
Warring tribes clash over waterholes/wells/boreholes near Lake Chad areas of
Djedaa and Massokory
20–21/11, 2000 SCAD (2015)
Farmers attacked herders after a herd of cattle wandered into cropland in search of
water and pasture (8 death)
4–10/1, 2001 SCAD (2015)
Stresses are captured at the Lake Chad regional scale to highlight the exposure of locals to climate and insecurity. Respondents in our study areas
were asked to give their perceptions about these stresses which were captured in our double exposure index
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Indicating basket value ¼
Indicator1 þ Indicator2 þ    þ Indicatorn
n
  ð1Þ
where n represents the number of indicators for a particular
basket.
The values of the indicating baskets were calculated to
obtain the CWCVI score for each livelihood group (Eq. 2).
CWCVIl ¼ w1B1 þ w2B2 þ    þ wnBn
W1 þW2 þ    þWn
 
ð2Þ
where CWCVI is the computed index for livelihood group
l, B1…..Bn are the indicating baskets, and w1……wn rep-
resent the number of indicators in each basket. The value
for each basket and overall vulnerability score were com-
puted for each livelihood group (farmers, fishermen and
pastoralists). The CWCVI is scaled from 0 (least vulnera-
ble) to 1 (most vulnerable).
Household surveys and interviews
Our study location was stratified into villages that are inter-
nally homogenous and externally heterogeneous based on a
set of ‘screening’ criteria that emphasised lake dwellers’
major livelihood activities in terms of contribution to income
and labour investments. We focused on three subgroups and
adopted a United Nations (2008) sample size calculation
method.At the 95 % level of confidence, a design effect of 2 to
account for stratified sampling,2±10 % precision and a 50 %
default value for point prevalence of selected indicators, we
selected 240 respondents,3 composed of farming (n = 80),
fishing (n = 80) and pastoral (n = 80) households, across
seven villages of different sizes. Selected households repre-
sent approximately 43 % of households in each village.
Fieldwork was conducted using household surveys and
semi-structured interviews. Due to the transient lifestyle of
many households and the non-availability of a sampling
frame for each village, we combined random walk, quota
and snowball sampling techniques to select respondents
Fig. 1 Methodological approach
2 We assume a sample design effect of 2, implying that the sample
variance for the stratified sample is two times bigger than it would be
if the surveys were based on a simple random sample of the same
size.
3 Sample size formula: N = [(z2) (r) (1-r) (f) (k)]/[(p) (n) (e2)],
N = sample size; z = 1.96 (95 % CI); r = 0.5 (default value for
prevalence of indicators); f = 2 (sample design effect); k = 1;
p = 0.54; n = 6; e = 0.05. Value descriptions/calculations are based
on United Nations (2008 p. 41–43).
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(United Nations 2008). The survey process began at the
homes of the village leaders, where consultations and
permissions were obtained. To specify the paths of travel,
some geographic starting points for each village were
identified and randomly selected (i.e. farmlands, pasture
areas, homesteads/settlements, waterways and desert-
grazing sites) with assistance from a local guide/gate-
keeper. Qualifying households from each subgroup par-
ticipated in the survey until a predetermined quota
(determined based on village sizes) was reached for each
village and for each subgroup (see Table A5 in the Sup-
plementary Material). Respondents were surveyed/inter-
viewed at different locations—some in their farmlands,
others while grazing animals or sorting fish from nets, and
yet others in their homes. We applied snowball sampling to
ensure low missing response frequencies and to attain a
specific quota per village by requesting the village leaders
and local guards to recommend households.
Data were collected following specific questions asso-
ciated with each indicator and focused on current vulner-
ability concerns. Surveys and interviews were conducted in
Arabic, French and Hausa and translated at the time of
collection. Because of the socio-cultural and religious
beliefs of the villages in which only males have the free-
dom to grant interviews, only responses from male
household heads were recorded. Where the household head
was unavailable, another male adult household member
participated. Data analysis was conducted at the household
level and later aggregated to obtain information on the
different subgroups (farmers, fishers and pastoralists). Data
were coded and analysed using SPSS v21.
Limitations of the CWCVI approach
Our non-random sampling approach accounts for the
transient lifestyle of many respondents. This limits our
ability to comment on whether or not differences in vul-
nerabilities for farmers, fishermen and pastoralists are
statistically significant (United Nations 2008). Nonetheless,
the assignment of directionality from least to most vul-
nerable provides a straightforward alternative to compare
and understand differential vulnerabilities (Hahn et al.
2009). While we recognise local arrangements that limit
females from granting interviews, our data may appear to
have under-represented vulnerable female-headed homes.
In this case, we cannot comment on the magnitude of any
potential selection bias. Further, because indicators are
aggregated at the ‘livelihood group’ scale and averaged
into one major indicating basket score, indexing does not
emphasise differences within groups (e.g. between farmers
Fig. 2 Indicative composite framework used to assess climate–water conflict vulnerability. *Indicators that are captured in each basket
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or between fishermen). Also, the study does not ‘statisti-
cally’ account for the directionality of the relationship
between indicators and vulnerability, although previous
studies assume both exposure and sensitivity indicators to
be positively correlated with vulnerability (Ide et al. 2014;
Krishnamurthy et al. 2014). The weighting method applied
constitutes less burden and time constraint on respondents
and enabled us to avoid any complications that may result
from experts’ inability to reach agreements over roles of
indicators/baskets in vulnerability outcomes. Yet it is
possible that other types of weights (or a combination of
weighting schemes) could add confidence to the CWCVI.
While many processes for operationalising vulnerability
(particularly the schemes for selecting, validating, stan-
dardising and weighing indicators) involve normative
judgement, the underlying approach employed to obtain
different vulnerability scores here is consistent with the
indexing approaches from larger vulnerability studies that
utilise indicators (Brooks et al. 2005; Eakin and Bojo´rquez-
Tapia 2008; Chen and Lopez-Carr 2015).
Results
CWCVI: farmers, fishermen and pastoralists
Values for each indicating baskets and the composite
CWCVI for farmers, fishermen and pastoralists are pre-
sented in Table 2. This study sought the experience and
views of farmers, fishermen and pastoralists in the sur-
veyed villages to understand climate and water conflict
exposures and vulnerability. Shifts in temperature and
rainfall indices were generally similar for all livelihood
groups. However, fishermen showed greatest vulnerability
on the climate variability basket than farmers and pas-
toralists because of the reported higher climate-related
losses due to the ‘low-fish-catch’ consequences from the
direct impacts of climate parameters on the Lake Chad
waters (CVfishermen 0.993, CVfarmers 0.987, CVpastoralists
0.963). The climate variability index serves to complement
existing data on climate and therefore should be interpreted
with caution since locations around the shores of Lake
Chad are equally exposed to climate variability.
The aggression index was higher for pastoralists (0.98)
than the other groups (farmers 0.81, fishermen 0.55). Pas-
toralists are often more aggressive during periods of
extreme water and pasture shortages. Their involvement in
water conflict often has a link with their inability to prevent
straying animals from water points around farmlands or
areas where fishermen’s nets or hook traps are positioned.
Farmers (95 %) and pastoralists (96 %) reported more
conflicts in their villages than fishermen (78 %). The
feeling of insecurity index showed a greater vulnerability
score for farmers (0.84) and a lower score for fishermen
(0.09) compared to pastoralists (0.43). Farmers on average
suffered greater losses in terms of crop destruction, post-
harvest damages, money expended settling conflict cases in
police stations, market closures and deaths due to water-
related conflicts. This is reflected in the index for losses/
death from conflict: farmers 0.65, pastoralists 0.52, fish-
ermen 0.16. Overall, farmers were more vulnerable than
pastoralists and fishermen on the water conflict basket
(0.768 vs. 0.750 vs. 0.352, respectively).
The influence of the variability in Lake Chad waters on
livelihoods has been systematically investigated elsewhere
(see Okpara et al. 2015). However, pastoralists showed
greater vulnerability on the lake water variability index
(0.573) than farmers and fishermen who had identical
scores of 0.495. A higher percentage of fishermen reported
relying solely on Lake Chad waters for domestic and
livelihood activities (lake water dependency index: fisher-
men 0.98, farmers 0.73, pastoralists 0.16). Consequently,
many fishermen had experienced income-related changes
resulting from the falling water levels of the Lake (index on
income-based changes: fishermen 0.73, farmers 0.59, pas-
toralists 0.39). The high vulnerability score for pastoralists
Table 2 Indexed indicating
baskets and overall CWCVI
scores for farmers, fishermen
and pastoralists in the south-
eastern portion of Lake Chad in
Chad Republic
Indicating baskets Number of indicators Values for indicating baskets
Farmers Fishermen Pastoralists
Climate variability (CW) 3 0.987 0.993 0.963
Water conflict (WC) 5 0.768 0.352 0.750
Lake water variability (LWV) 4 0.495 0.495 0.573
Natural/physical assets (NPA) 3 0.387 0.863 0.847
Socio-demographic (SD) 4 0.450 0.475 0.470
Livelihood strategies (LS) 5 0.648 0.620 0.70
Social/political networks (SPN) 4 0.623 0.533 0.74
CWCVI 0.62 0.59 0.71
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for this basket is reflected in the indicators that report water
scarcity (0.94) and distance (over 50 km) to the Lake Chad
water point (0.80).
The vulnerability scores for the physical/natural asset
basket were similar for fishermen and pastoralists (0.863
versus 0.847). Both had a higher score than farmers
(0.387). While most farmer respondents (90 %) have
relatively consistent water supplies or a backup water
source through village water pumps and private wells,
fishermen and pastoralists reported a declining trend in
the volume and quality of the water sources they can
access (mostly rivers and streams around villages). Private
land ownership is more common amongst farmers than
the other groups with higher vulnerability scores for the
land access indicator. Weak, less climate-resistant houses
are common in all villages. Households live in either
mud-walled thatched houses, brick houses with iron
sheets or make-shift houses. The latter is common
amongst pastoralists. Basic government-owned physical
assets (schools, hospitals, boreholes, markets and
telecommunication) are either non-existent or widely
dispersed and poorly equipped.
Approximately 93 % of pastoralists, 86 % of farmers
and 80 % of fishermen do not have access to social/po-
litical support during difficult times. Although fishermen
are more isolated in terms of their village settings on
islands, they often received more visits from NGOs,
researchers and institutions. This contact enabled access
to weather and livelihood-related information (without
access to information index: pastoralists 0.68, farmers
0.63, fishermen 0.36). However, where promises regard-
ing aid/support are made, they are often never fulfilled
(personal communication with the leader of fishermen,
Kaesai, February 2014). Except for a few farmers, the
majority of respondents are not members of any formal
local association. Cooperation was common amongst
fishermen during periods of harsh weather conditions and
aggression. Overall, pastoralists were more vulnerable
than farmers and fishermen on the social/political network
basket (SPNpastoralists 0.74, SPNfarmers 0.623, SPNfishermen
0.533).
Pastoralists showed greater vulnerability on the liveli-
hood strategies basket (0.70) than farmers (0.648) and
fishermen (0.620). Most farmers reported not receiving
remittances in the form of cash and in-kind help from
family members who travel outside the village to work or
from friends/colleagues living mainly in urban areas
(remittance index: farmers 0.78, pastoralists 0.63, fisher-
men 0.55). Further, the majority of fishermen reported
that they have no access to credit/loans to support their
activities, while more pastoralists reported having less
income to cover important household expenses. A large
proportion of farmers and pastoralists rely solely on one
agriculture-based activity for income (agriculture depen-
dency index: farmers 0.80, pastoralists 0.80, fishermen
0.61). Fishermen are more diversified in their livelihood
activities; they fish, grow crops, trade fish, use boats for
transportation and engage in menial jobs as ways to cope
with livelihood challenges. The livelihood diversification
scores reflect the vulnerability of the three groups
(farmers 0.33, pastoralists 0.33, fishermen 0.28). When
the five indicators were averaged, the vulnerability score
for the livelihood strategies basket was highest for
pastoralists.
The age index was highest for farmers (0.27) than
fishermen (0.24) and pastoralists (0.18). Overall however,
fishermen showed greater vulnerability on the socio-de-
mographic basket than the other groups (SDfishermen 0.475,
SDpastoralists 0.470, SDfarmers 0.450). A large proportion of
household heads across all villages never attended school,
although they reported having various years of experience
in agricultural activities (farmers 16.8 ± 12.7; fishermen
14.2 ± 5.6; pastoralists 27 ± 8.1). Approximately 3 % of
farmers reported having 0–2 years of experience. Over
90 % of fishermen and pastoralists have no access to
medical services/facilities. During illness, they travel 2–12
kilometres to Guitte or Dandi to local clinics.
Values for the indicating baskets are shown in a radar
chart (Fig. 3). The diagram, with scales in 0.1 increments
ranging from 0 (least vulnerable) at the centre of the web
to 1 (most vulnerable) at the outside edge, shows which
baskets contribute most to climate variability–water con-
flict vulnerability across the surveyed livelihood groups.
Pastoralists are ‘most vulnerable’ in terms of Lake water
variability, livelihood strategies and social/political net-
works, while farmers are ‘most vulnerable’ in terms of
water conflict and fishermen in terms of climate vari-
ability, physical/natural assets and socio-demographic
profile. In sum, pastoralists had the highest CWCVI (0.71)
than farmers (0.62) and fishermen (0.59), indicating rel-
atively greater vulnerability to climate variability and
water conflict.
The CWCVI and double exposure
Based on the IPCC vulnerability typology, eight indica-
tors fall within our exposure categorisation (see Fig. 1).
The CWCVI analysis captures double exposure in the
form of climate variability and water conflict. The values
of these two baskets, drawn from their contributing
indicator scores, are incorporated into the double expo-
sure index (DEI) computation to specifically draw out
double exposure for all resource user groups. Table 3
shows the DEI for the different groups as DEIfarmers 0.85,
DEIpastoralists 0.83 and DEIfishermen 0.60. Figure 4 illus-
trates an integrated vulnerability and ‘double exposure’
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triangle which plots the scores for DEI and CWCVI for
the three livelihood groups. Accounting for the DEI as an
embedded component of the composite CWCVI, Table 3
indicates that farmers may be more exposed to the double
(combined) effects of climate variability and water con-
flict than other livelihood groups in a context where the
CWCVI was highest for pastoralists, and the CWCVI and
DEI for fishermen yielded similar values.
Discussion
Unpacking the implications of the CWCVI–DEI
assessment
Recurrent shifts in temperatures and rainfall, including
water-related conflicts, are well-known livelihood stresses
in the Sahel, often acting in combination to alter
0
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Climate Variability
Water Conﬂict
Lake Water Variability
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Livelihood Strategies
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Fishermen
Pastoralists
0 = Least vulnerable
1 = Most vulnerable
Fig. 3 Vulnerability radar
chart of the indicating baskets of
the CWCVI for different
livelihood groups at the south-
eastern Lake Chad shores
Table 3 Summary of computed
double exposure indices for
farmers, fishermen and
pastoralists
Based on the summarising methoda:
VDE ¼ DEI ¼ ðW  BÞCV þ ðW  BÞWC
WCV þWWC
  DEIfarmers
3ð0:987Þþ5ð0:768Þ
3þ5 ¼ 0:85
DEIfishermen 3ð0:993Þþ5ð0:352Þ
3þ5 ¼ 0:60
DEIpastoralists 3ð0:963Þþ5ð0:750Þ
3þ5 ¼ 0:83
VDE is a recast version of Eq. 2 (adopted from Hahn et al. (2009)) accounting for vulnerability under double
exposure. DEI is double exposure index. W (number of indicators in each basket) and B (indicating basket)
are based on climate variability (CV) and water conflict (WC) contributing indicators
a Index values are interpreted as relative values for livelihood groups within the study context only and are
based on views from the local resource users in our sample. The DEI is on a scale from 0 (least ‘double
exposed’) to 1 (most ‘double exposed’)
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Fig. 4 Integrated vulnerability
and double exposure triangle
diagram illustrating the CWCVI
and DEI for farming, fishing and
pastoral livelihood groups
360 U. T. Okpara et al.
123
agricultural production, food supplies and livelihood
dynamics (Benjaminsen 2008; Couttenier and Soubeyran
2014; Uexkull 2014). Losses from climate and water con-
flict impacts represent an important vulnerability concern
in our study context. In contrast to existing data on tem-
perature and rainfall which suggest similar climatic pat-
terns for locations within the Lake Chad basin, local
people’s perceptions about climate variability indicated
that differences exist in local exposures, vulnerability and
responses. Our findings show that fishermen are more
vulnerable to climate-related losses, but were better off in
terms of response capacities through social/political net-
works and livelihood income strategies than farmers and
pastoralists. Most local water conflict reports were received
from pastoralists, including reports on aggression related to
water. Yet it was the farmers who suffered the most from
the consequences of water conflict. The high percentage of
farmers who felt insecure in their villages and who reported
crop, cash and human losses in the past five years underline
the reasons many entry routes into farm villages were
manned by local security personnel. The majority of
farmers reported having the mobile telecommunication
contacts of security officials to enable receipt of immediate
help in the event of conflict.
Although our analysis yielded a high water conflict
vulnerability score for farmers, we noted low vulnerabil-
ity on the natural/physical asset basket for farmers, par-
ticularly in terms of access to backup water sources and
land. This reflects why pastoralists (mostly) often
encroached into farmlands and/or migrated towards farm
villages. Resource scarcity and the relatively regular
contacts farmers have with pastoralists and fishermen
underlie the reasons for approximately 75 % of the con-
flicts reported in farm villages. This finding has crucial
implications for conversations regarding Lake Chad
variability. Although the Lake waters play a central role
in livelihoods, the relatively high dependence of villages
on the Lake contributed to the income-based changes they
experienced during low water levels. While fishermen
suffered from limited water quality, pastoralists reported
that they struggle to find water (in terms of volume and
quality) during annual dry periods. Although pastoralists
did not report the same level of dependence on lake
waters and income-related changes resulting from lake
water fluctuations as other groups, they had a higher
vulnerability to lake water variability. Development pro-
grammes for village assistance regarding water supplies
might constitute an appropriate intervention for locals,
especially pastoralists needing secure watering points.
When such an intervention is locally defined and centrally
enforced, the frequent aggression amongst resource users
during periods of water shortages can become minimal
(Turner 2004).
Despite receiving more remittances than farmers and
having greater access to credit/loans than fishermen, the
pastoralists showed more vulnerability than the other
groups on the livelihoods income strategies index.
Depending solely on livestock for meat, milk and cash
meant that pastoralists are prone to income fluctuations
resulting from cattle devaluation, diseases, scarcity of
quality feed and conflict (Majekodunmi et al. 2014).
Opportunities for alternative and supplementary liveli-
hoods were limited in all the surveyed villages. The low
socio-demographic profiles, as reflected mostly through
limited education amongst a large proportion of the
respondents, suggest why efforts by a few to diversify
agricultural livelihoods were unable to fill immediate cash
needs. To better capture livelihood income, future research
might approach this by including quantitative estimates of
annual income and expenditure across various groups.
While there are many measures of social/political net-
works at the local level (Eakin and Bojo´rquez-Tapia 2008;
Hahn et al. 2009), documenting membership in associa-
tions, receipt of external support/assistance, access to cli-
mate and livelihood-related information and local
cooperation provide an indirect way of teasing out the
contribution of social/political networks to differential
vulnerability across different livelihood groups (Shah et al.
2013). Membership in group- or village-level associations
influences the way local people bond with one another,
including their access to informal insurance and logistic
supports, and capacity for collective actions (Baird and
Gray 2014). This form of social capital is crucial for
decreasing vulnerability to climate and conflict impacts
(Uexkull 2014). In contrast to fishermen who were better
off in terms of cooperation and access to information, and a
few farmers who belonged to farming associations, pas-
toralists were more limited in their social/political net-
works. Pastoralists’ migratory lifestyle influences their
perception of the cost of and benefits from social/political
participation or engagement with authorities at the village
and district levels (The´baud and Batterbury 2001). Despite
occasional visits by agencies providing social and eco-
nomic assistance, respondents reported that such visits
were yet to translate into any solid relationship between
villages and agencies/institutions. Further investigation
(e.g. through focus groups) into how location-specific
characteristics disrupt village linkages with the state and
aid donors would help uncover reasons why social support
and livelihood assistance remain largely non-existent in the
surveyed villages.
Our interactions with local experts and observations
during field visits suggest that water conflict may have
contributed more to local exposure challenges than climate
variability. While this may not be detected from the DEI
scores, the DEI nonetheless reflected an important
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conclusion regarding climate variability (CV) and water
conflict (WC) exposures amongst different groups in the
area. Despite the high climate-related losses reported by
fishermen, including their high vulnerability to natu-
ral/physical assets and socio-demographic profile, they
showed lower CWCVI and DEI scores than the rest of the
groups. Indicators that constitute our sensitivity and
adaptive capacity elements did not create any difference
between ‘double exposure’ and vulnerability in our com-
putation of fishermen’s vulnerability. This might require
further investigation to understand why this is the case.
Fishermen’s low vulnerability to water conflict and better
social networks may have accounted for the low CWCVI
score. Although farmers and pastoralists did not show
similar low vulnerability, in the absence of development
supports that address poor infrastructure, lack of repre-
sentation and ineffective systems of conflict management,
including social protection and livelihoods planning
(Luxereau et al. 2012; Ovie and Emma 2012), the local
populations in Lake Chad would face challenges in
adapting to future changes in livelihood conditions.
Prioritising vulnerability assessment in climate
and water conflict research
There is a livelihood security imperative to frame climate
conflict research around vulnerability (Gemenne et al.
2014). Yet applying a vulnerability lens to explain climate
and water conflict link raises complex challenges. The link
is not exclusively a collection of environmental (supply),
institutional (restraint) and social (demand) drivers that can
be understood purely in scientific or technical one-size-fits-
all ways (Bo¨hmelt et al. 2014). It reflects a conundrum of
underlying realities that are context, place and time
specific, and contingent on an array of theoretical postu-
lations regarding what indicators or metrics that research-
ers deem important (Buhaug 2015). This is why attempts to
link climate and conflict stresses in vulnerability assess-
ments is arguably the least advanced aspect of vulnerability
science (Busby et al. 2014). Nevertheless, the contextual
nature of the CWCVI provides a vulnerability lens
depicting a range of indicating variables that inform cli-
mate–water conflict thinking for lake-dependent environ-
ments. It points to a repertoire of potential explanatory
factors (e.g. feelings of insecurity, dependency on Lake
water and agriculture, climate-related losses and livelihood
diversity) linking climate and (water) conflict (Scheffran
et al. 2012).
Our findings underline how background conditions of
vulnerability are an important entry point in identifying
ways people are likely to face threats of death or
livelihood emergencies resulting from climate-related
events. Theoretical conversations on peace building
show that conditions where human needs are grossly
denied can be critical drivers of vulnerability (Le Billon
2003; Yardley 2013; Matthew 2014). Territories with
problematic societal conditions such as insurgencies,
high levels of militarisation and increased displacement
of human population convey a broad spectrum of leading
conditions that shape the climate conflict dimensions of
vulnerability (Verhoeven 2014). Although the arrival of
water conflict is often signalled years in advance by
deteriorating climatic, socio-demographic, economics
and governance conditions, the CWCVI variables pro-
vide a basis for a fine-grained causality analysis that can
lead to socially focused solutions—such as group agri-
cultural cooperatives, conservation of common property
resources and conflict resolution, and strengthening of
collective adaptation actions. These solutions are con-
sistent with what many consider as suitable vulnerability
interventions in a climate–conflict context where vul-
nerability is experienced (Scheffran et al. 2012; Sterzel
et al. 2014).
Our results establish that biophysical and socio-eco-
nomic factors trump several determinants of vulnerability.
Comparison with climate and water conflict case studies
(e.g. Ludwig et al. 2011; Tir and Stinnett 2012; Bo¨hmelt
et al. 2014; Kuzdas and Wiek 2014; Selby and Hoffmann
2014; Ide 2015) indicates both good agreement in terms of
the utility of our indicators in understanding climate vari-
ability and water conflict links and a prospect to expand the
indicators as data for other conflict-torn portions of the
Lake become available.
It is important to stress that research efforts to priori-
tise vulnerability frameworks or indicators applicable to
climate and water conflict analysis should be undertaken
with caution. Choice of vulnerability indicators is largely
based on subjectivity and use of several kinds of proxies
(Hinkel 2011) that may influence how climate–water
conflict relations are interpreted. By using a mix of expert
views and theories, our study has demonstrated the need
to control the way normative judgements translate into
indicating variables used in characterising vulnerability to
double stresses. Further, the directions of causality, in
terms of pathways and feedbacks, may not be easily
teased out from quantitative, empirical vulnerability
studies. Additional steps in econometric modelling (e.g.
Opiyo et al. 2014) underpinned by fundamental variables
that are known to influence the directionality of vulner-
ability may complement indicator-based approaches. In
doing this, the research design can move beyond main-
stream views that privilege climate-induced resource
scarcities in conflict outcomes by considering the balance
between vulnerability and adaptability as a key contextual
entry point to understanding climate–water conflict
relations.
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Conclusion
Many works on climate and water conflict relations pay
insufficient attention to vulnerability determinants, in par-
ticular the fundamental issues that shape directionality of
vulnerability. Although the contested nature of the vul-
nerability concept is widely recognised, it cannot be
assumed that there is broad consensus regarding what
constitutes scientifically sound explanatory variables for
climate and water conflict relations. In response to recent
calls to uncover local dynamics of climate and environ-
mental conflict interactions (Gemenne et al. 2014; Bo¨hmelt
et al. 2014), we present the CWCVI as a tool for exploring
ordinary people’s differentiated vulnerability and capaci-
ties to adapt to change. The tool resonates with livelihood
perspectives and uses a normative framing consistent with
the context, place and time-specific nature of both vul-
nerability and climate conflict analyses.
We applied the CWCVI in selected Lake Chad villages
composed of farming, fishing and pastoral livelihoods and
found that in contrast to farmers and fishermen, pastoralists
were more vulnerable to climate variability and water
conflict stresses. They were prone to climate-structured
aggressive behaviour, have limited social networks and
livelihood income strategies, and their migratory lifestyle
often pitched them against other resource users. Using
‘views from the vulnerable’ and accounting for the DEI as
an embedded component of the CWCVI, we illustrated that
water conflict and climate variability are important expo-
sure elements amongst groups and that farmers may be
more exposed to the double (combined) effects of climate
variability and water conflict. Further, we employed the
CWCVI to understand how drivers of vulnerability may be
useful in explaining climate and water conflict interactions
and noted that besides informing climate conflict thinking,
the CWCVI can provide the basis for causality analysis. It
privileges the directionality of vulnerability by focusing on
the usefulness of the vulnerability lens over resource
scarcity in operationalising climate–water conflict relations
for lake-dependent environment.
The CWCVI and DEI approaches have several
strengths. First, our multi-step methods of index compu-
tation and data collection provide detailed quantitative
information about livelihood vulnerabilities, as well as
local perceptions of shifting climatic conditions and con-
flict outcomes. Many indicator-based vulnerability studies
focus on quantitative comparison of vulnerabilities across
districts and regions, emphasising a single environmental
or social stressor/hazard. Few studies use household survey
data to develop vulnerability indices that capture double
exposures across different resource user groups in the
manner this study has done. Second, the DEI approach uses
the views of ‘vulnerable locals’ to gain insight into climatic
and conflict situations and therefore can comment on dif-
ferences in double exposure amongst farmers, fishermen
and pastoralists despite popular belief (based on existing
secondary data) that villages within Lake Chad are simi-
larly exposed to climate and water conflict. Third, the study
presents a model that aggregates indicators to better
understand the strength of livelihoods/households to resist
pressures resulting from double exposure. Although it is
unclear how the CWCVI and DEI scores might change if
different weighting methods are employed, comparison
with other studies across the region confirms that fishing
and fish trading allow for more stability (see Luxereau
et al. 2012) and that the ‘capacity of fishing activities to
generate instantaneous gains represent an enormous
advantage over farming’ (Bene et al. 2003, p. 43) and over
pastoral activities as well. This, somehow, confirms that the
group we find to be relatively less vulnerable (i.e. fisher-
men) is the same one that comes up in these studies.
The deep-rooted issues identified through the CWCVI
raise concerns about the ability of resource users to con-
front current and future challenges associated with climate
change and growing insecurity. The CWCVI communi-
cates locally appropriate insights about what may con-
tribute to apparently new forms of interventions for rural
livelihoods. Replication of our approach in the same
location over time might communicate useful information
about changes in vulnerability as adaptation and other
livelihood interventions are initiated provided that any
potential biases in sampling techniques and indicator
selections are given considerations. However, as with any
index approach, there is need for caution in interpreting
any empirical findings since indicators and indices, by their
nature, can mask underlying multidimensional realities
shaping vulnerability.
Further refinement of the indicator framework might
focus on regional contexts to more accurately quantify
how the factors operating beyond the household realm
shape the roles of climate and water conflict in driving
local vulnerabilities. Similarly, future research can
account for duration and severity of double exposure
elements to uncover the extent indicators and indices
oversimplify complex climate and water conflict realities.
In doing this, scenarios of climate and conflict changes
can be introduced into the indexing process to capture
hidden and also future vulnerabilities. It is hoped that the
CWCVI tool will help guide discussions on the need to
prioritise vulnerability assessments in climate conflict
research, particularly in order to better explain the inter-
actions between climate variability and water conflict in a
way that is easy to understand without glossing over the
complexity.
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